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Abstract 
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stable steady state. These results hold under four different monetary policy strategies 
applied by the monetary authority. A monetary contraction increases the bond return, 
reduces the equity premium and thereby capital investment and growth. 
 
Keywords 
Monetary policy, endogenous growth, equity premium 
JEL Classifications 
D84, E52, O42 
 Comments 
Paper presented at the EEA2000 Congress in Bozen-Bolzano. The research on this paper originated 
while Gerd Weinrich was visiting the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. The authors thank Klaus 
Ritzberger, participants at the EEA2000 Congress, and seminar participants at the Catholic University 
of Milan for helpful discussions and comments. All errors and shortcomings are of their responsibility. 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
2 The Model 3 
2.1 The Consumer .................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 The Firms ............................................................................................................................ 5 
2.3 The Government ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.4 The Equilibrium ................................................................................................................... 7 
3 Monetary Policy 7 
3.1 Constant Money Growth ..................................................................................................... 7 
3.2 Fixed Money-bond Ratio ....................................................................................................11 
3.3 Interest Rate Targeting ...................................................................................................... 13 
3.4 Inflation Targeting .............................................................................................................. 14 
4 Adaptive Expectations 16 
5 Conclusions 19 
References  19 
 
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the question of how monetary policy a®ects growth. The
traditional literature on monetary growth theory emphasizes the Mundell{Tobin
or \portfolio" e®ect which says that money growth a®ects the capital stock pos-
itively, since higher in°ation reduces the return on real balances which induces
investors to reallocate savings from money to capital (see Mundell (1965), Tobin
(1965)). Within dynamic general equilibrium models, however, such an e®ect is
hard to ¯nd and most studies report either superneutrality of money or even a
negative relation between money growth and real activity.1 As the theoretical
literature, also empirical studies on this issue draw di®erent conclusions.2
Most of the theoretical literature considers only a single outside asset (money)
and examines the e®ects of variations of the growth rate of this asset. In such
a framework, however, the impact of di®erent monetary strategies on real ac-
tivity cannot be studied adequately. To address this issue, Schreft and Smith
(1997, 1998) consider a Diamond{type overlapping generations model with out-
side money and government bonds in which di®erent monetary policy strategies
like a constant money growth rule, an in°ation targeting or an interest target-
ing rule can be studied. They show that there exist multiple steady states and
that the e®ects of monetary policy on the output level in these steady states are
ambiguous.
Schreft and Smith assume that government bonds and physical capital are
perfect substitutes in the portfolios of consumers and that ¯rms ¯nance their
capital investments by loans for which they pay the same interest rate as the
government on treasury bills. Thus, the rates of return on government bonds and
capital coincide, and monetary policy a®ects both interest rates in the same way.
For instance, if a higher bond return is induced by a tightening of monetary policy,
the capital return and thereby capital investment increase as well. However, this
assumption of Diamond{type growth models neglects that ¯rms ¯nance (part
of) their capital investment by equity and that the equity return exceeds the
return on government bonds. If there is a positive spread between the equity and
the bond return, a higher bond return need not increase the capital return, but
may decrease the risk premium, induce investors to buy less equity, and thereby
induce ¯rms to accumulate less capital. Hence, the traditional Mundell{Tobin
1See, for instance, Sidrauski (1967), Brock (1974) and Stockman (1981). More recently,
Jones and Manuelli (1995) show a negative correlation between in°ation and growth in an
endogenous growth model, and Azariadis and Smith (1996) ¯nd a negative relationship between
in°ation and output at high in°ation which is reversed at low in°ation. For surveys on money
and growth, see Orphanides and Solow (1990) and von Thadden (1999).
2In fact, most empirical studies report a negative correlation between in°ation and growth,
which is particularly strong at high in°ation rates. However, Bullard and Keating (1995)
and McCandless and Weber (1995) show that in°ation (money growth resp.) and growth are
uncorrelated in large samples, while they are positively correlated in subsamples of low{in°ation
countries.
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e®ect reappears.
This paper departs from the model of Schreft and Smith in two important
ways. First, ¯rms ¯nance capital investments by equity instead of bonds and the
equity return exceeds the bond return, since there are stochastic productivity
shocks and since consumers are risk averse. Second, because of an Arrow{Romer
spillover of capital investment on labor productivity, the aggregate technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale which gives rise to endogenous growth. This
enables us to study the growth e®ects of monetary policy.
Speci¯cally, consumers transfer the labor income of their ¯rst lifetime period
to the second period by means of three assets: money, government bonds, and
equity. Because of a cash{in{advance constraint consumers hold money even if it
is return dominated by bonds and equity.3 Since consumers are risk averse and
since the equity return is uncertain, both the equity and the bond demand can
be positive when there is a positive (expected) equity premium. Firms ¯nance
capital investments only by issuing equity. The government consumes a ¯xed
share of output and ¯nances its de¯cit by bonds and by seignorage, whereas
the monetary authority controls the money supply by conducting open market
operations. Hence, the monetary authority determines the seignorage revenue of
the government and can apply di®erent types of monetary strategies. We consider
four monetary policy strategies: a constant money growth rule, a stabilization of
the ratio of money to bonds, an in°ation targeting and an interest rate targeting
rule.
As the model of Schreft and Smith, our model may well have multiple steady
states4, depending on the parameter speci¯cations and on the monetary strategy.
However, only one of these steady states is locally stable, both in the forward
perfect foresight dynamics and under adaptive expectations. Moreover, we ¯nd
that money a®ects growth positively in any stable steady state and for any type
of monetary strategy. Only under interest rate targeting the growth e®ect is
ambiguous and depends on the size of the risk premium. If the risk premium is
too low, an increase in the nominal interest target is accompanied by a larger
increase in in°ation which leads to a lower real interest rate and thus to higher
growth.
A loose monetary policy raises the seignorage revenue which allows the gov-
ernment to issue less bonds and which reduces thereby the real bond return. Since
the expected capital return is constant in our simple AK{type growth model, this
raises the equity premium and induces consumers to shift more savings to capital
which leads to a higher growth rate. By the same mechanism, an increase of
¯scal expenditures unambiguously reduces the growth rate in any stable steady
3In Schreft and Smith's model the use of money is motivated by random liquidity shocks
and liquidity is provided by banks. Our cash-in-advance constraint is equivalent to the banks'
liquidity constraint of Schreft and Smith (1997) if consumers are assumed to have logarithmic
preferences.
4We use the term steady state to denote a balanced growth path.
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state, which is in accordance with the ¯ndings of Barro (1990), since government
services do not a®ect production or utility in our model.
Our argument provides an alternative to related work of van der Ploeg and
Alogoskou¯s (1994) who consider the impact of monetary policy in an overlapping
generations model in the spirit of Weil (1991) and with endogenous growth due
to an Arrow{Romer externality. They ¯nd that higher money growth rates a®ect
growth positively since currently living generations do not bene¯t from tax cuts
in the future, and therefore consume less and invest more which increases the
long{run real growth rate. In our model, however, such e®ects of intertemporal
taxation are absent, and growth is raised by the monetary policy's impact on
asset prices and the equity premium.
Our model also relates to Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2) who consider a
Diamond{type growth model in which consumers hold money because of a cash{
in{advance constraint. Unlike Schreft and Smith, Hahn and Solow not only focus
on steady states in which money is return dominated by bonds and in which
the cash{in{advance constraint on consumers is binding (consumers are liquidity
constrained), but they also analyse steady states in which the rate of returns
on money and bonds are equal (the nominal interest rate is zero) and in which
consumers are portfolio indi®erent. In this paper, we also consider such portfolio{
indi®erence steady states, but we ¯nd that their existence depends crucially on
the monetary strategy. For instance, under constant money growth or under
in°ation targeting, portfolio indi®erence steady states exist only in pathological
cases, and under a ¯xed money{bond ratio they only exist if the monetary policy
is su±ciently loose. When they exist, however, monetary policy has no e®ect on
the growth rate in these steady states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the economic agents and derives the model's equilibrium conditions. Section 3
examines the perfect foresight equilibrium growth paths of the model and dis-
cusses the existence, multiplicity and comparative statics of steady states under
four di®erent monetary strategies. Section 4 looks at the dynamics with adaptive
expectations and shows that the stability features of the forward perfect foresight
dynamics are preserved. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an overlapping generations model in which there are three types of
agents: consumers, ¯rms and a government. They trade a composite consumption
good and labor as well as three types of ¯nancial assets: money, bonds and
equity. The government issues ¯at money and bonds, while ¯rms ¯nance their
capital investments by issuing equity. Since the capital return is uncertain due
to stochastic productivity shocks, risk averse consumers require a positive equity
premium. Furthermore, because of a liquidity constraint money is held even when
3
it is return dominated by bonds. In detail the agents are described as follows.
2.1 The Consumer
There is a single representative consumer who is endowed with one unit of labor in
his ¯rst period which he supplies inelastically, whereas he consumes in his second
period of life only. He aims to transfer his real labor income wt to the second
period by holding money (mt), bonds (bt) or equity (et). The corresponding real
gross rates of return are RMt = pt=pt+1; R
B
t and R
E
t , respectively. The consumer
faces a liquidity constraint for money holdings, mt ¸ ¸wt; where ¸ 2 [0; 1). While
RMt and R
B
t are foreseen with certainty, the equity return is uncertain and the
consumer expects rationally that REt is normally distributed with density function
g(¢;REt ; ¾2), where REt is the mean and ¾2 the variance. Moreover, the consumer
is risk averse and his von Neumann{Morgenstern utility function is assumed to
be ut (ct+1) = ¡e¡½tct+1 where ½t = ½=wt and ½ > 0 is given. This means that the
consumer's absolute risk aversion, ½t, decreases as his income increases and will
imply that, on a balanced growth path, he has constant relative risk aversion.5
The consumer's decision problem is
max
ct+1;mt;bt;et
Eut (ct+1) (1)
s.t. ct+1 · RMt mt +RBt bt +REt et; mt + bt + et · wt; mt ¸ ¸wt; et ¸ 0:
Notice that a necessary condition for a solution to this problem is that RBt ¸ RMt ;
since we have not imposed a lower bound on bond holdings. If RBt < R
M
t , the
consumer could issue arbitrarily many bonds and hold cash in order to guarantee
an arbitrarily high consumption level. When RBt > R
M
t , the liquidity constraint
must be binding, hence we have
RBt ¸ RMt ; mt ¸ ¸wt;
¡
RBt ¡RMt
¢
(mt ¡ ¸wt) = 0 . (2)
The following Lemma shows that the equity demand is an increasing function of
income and the expected equity premium.
Lemma 1 The consumer's equity demand is edt = max
(
R
E
t ¡RBt
½¾2
wt; 0
)
.
5It may appear a peculiar feature of the utility function that it is decreasing in income wt.
Note, however, that wt is not a choice variable for the consumer and, moreover, that this is
only a "cardinal" aspect of the utility function in that it could be easily overcome by assuming
for example ut (ct+1) = ¡½¯t e¡½tct+1 , with ¯ su±ciently large, without changing anything in
the consumer's preference structure and in the analytical results. The alternative to assume
a CRRA utility function c1¡½t+1 = (1 ¡ ½) together with a lognormal density for the equity return
would not work in the present context since ct+1 is a sum a + bR
E
t with R
E
t the variable of
integration in the integral that represents the expected utility. Then the integral could not be
solved explicitly.
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Proof: The consumer's problem is
max
mt;bt;et
Z
¡e¡½t[RMt mt+RBt bt+ret]g
³
r;R
E
t ; ¾
2
´
dr ,
subject to the constraints in (1). The integral can be written
¡e¡½t[RMt mt+RBt bt]
Z
e¡½tretg
³
r;R
E
t ; ¾
2
´
dr
and, using the formula
R
etxg (x; º; ¾2) dx = etº+(t
2=2)¾2, it becomes
¡e¡½t
h
RMt mt+R
B
t bt+R
E
t et¡(½t=2)e2t¾2
i
:
Substituting bt = wt ¡mt ¡ et, the problem is equivalent to
max
mt¸¸wt;et¸0
¡
RMt ¡RBt
¢
mt +
³
R
E
t ¡RBt
´
et ¡ (½t=2) e2t¾2:
The solution of this problem leads immediately to (2) and to the claimed equity
demand. 2
An alternative formulation of Lemma 2.1 is
R
E
t = R
B
t +
½¾2
wt
edt (3)
whenever edt > 0: This re°ects the equity premium required due to uncertainty
and risk aversion of consumers.
2.2 The Firms
Firms are risk{neutral and they produce output Yt from labor input Lt and
capital input Kt using the production technology Yt = ©tF (Kt; AtLt). ©t is a
total factor productivity shock which is realized only after capital is installed and
workers are hired, and all ©t are independently and normally distributed with
mean 1 and variance ¾2©.
6 F exhibits constant returns to scale and At measures
labor productivity at time t. Firms have to install capital a period in advance
by issuing equity. Thus equity supply in period t ¡ 1 is et¡1 = Kt. Since ¯rms
¯nance capital input by issuing equity instead of bonds, ¯rms maximize pro¯t
with respect to labor while capital demand is determined consistently with capital
supply of the investors and with the rationality of their expectations (see Hahn
and Solow (1995, Chapter 4)).
6This speci¯cation implies that output and the equity return can be negative with positive
probability. However, these pathological realizations occur only with a small probability if ¾©
is not too large.
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GivenKt at the beginning of period t, the ¯rm's expected pro¯t maximization
problem is
max
Lt
E (©tF (Kt; AtLt)¡ wtLt)
which leads to
wt = At (f(kt)¡ ktf 0(kt)) , (4)
where kt = Kt=(AtLt) and f(kt) = F (kt; 1). To endogenize At, we assume a
positive spillover from aggregate investment on labor productivity, as suggested
by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). To be consistent with long{run endogenous
growth, we use a linear relationship of the form
At =
1
a
Kt , (5)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock. The size of ¯rms is normalized to 1, so
Kt = Kt has to hold in equilibrium, and labor market clearing implies Lt = 1.
This together with (5) substituted in (4) implies
wt = ®Kt = ®et¡1 where ® =
f(a)
a
¡ f 0(a) . (6)
This in turn implies that the equity return is
REt¡1 =
©tF (Kt; AtLt)¡ wtLt
Kt
= ©t
f(a)
a
¡ ® .
Since ©t is normally distributed, R
E
t¡1 is also normally distributed. Rational
expectations of investors imply that
R
E
t¡1 =
f(a)
a
¡ ® = f 0(a) and ¾2 = ¾2©
µ
f(a)
a
¶2
. (7)
Thus, the expected equity return is constant over time and equals the marginal
product of capital at the balanced growth level of the capital intensity. This
result is due to the constant returns assumption and it implies that if there was
no uncertainty and if ¯rms could issue bonds instead of equity, the ¯rm would
choose the same level of capital input at the interest rate RBt = R
E
t . Therefore
bonds and equity would then also be equivalent from the perspective of ¯rms.
2.3 The Government
The government spends an amount gt of the composite consumption good and
¯nances its de¯cit by issuing bonds and money. We assume that the government's
expenditures are a constant share of expected output EYt = F (Kt; AtLt) =
(f(a)=a)Kt, i.e. gt = q
f(a)
a
et¡1 where q 2 [0; 1) . The government has to satisfy
its budget constraint
6
RBt¡1bt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 = bt +mt ¡RMt¡1mt¡1 . (8)
The left hand side denotes real government expenditures on consumption and
interest payments, and the right hand side contains the newly issued bonds and
a seignorage term.
2.4 The Equilibrium
By Walras's law, equilibrium on the labor, money, bond, and equity markets
imply that also the goods market is in equilibrium, i.e. Yt = ct+gt+et. Notice that
only consumption adjusts to productivity shocks, since government consumption
is predetermined and since investment (=equity demand) is a constant fraction of
labour income which is not a®ected by productivity shocks (see (6)). Substituting
(6) into the consumer's budget constraint yields
mt + et + bt = ®et¡1 . (9)
Moreover, inserting (6) and (7) into (3) implies
RBt = f
0 (a)¡ ½¾
2
®
et
et¡1
. (10)
Using (6) again, (2) becomes
RBt ¸ RMt ; mt ¸ ¸®et¡1;
¡
RBt ¡RMt
¢
(mt ¡ ¸®et¡1) = 0 . (11)
Equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) are dynamical equations with endogenous vari-
ables mt; et; bt; R
B
t and R
M
t that permit to study the evolution of the system
provided the number of state variables is reduced to four. This will be achieved
by speci¯cations of monetary policy rules that we study in the sequel.
3 Monetary Policy
We will consider in this section four di®erent monetary policy rules: a constant
money growth policy, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes the ratio of
money to government bonds, an interest rate targeting and an in°ation targeting
policy.
3.1 Constant Money Growth
Adopting a constant money growth rule meansMt = ¹Mt¡1 for all t, with ¹ ¸ 1,
where Mt is nominal money. Recalling that R
M
t = pt=pt+1; this can equivalently
be written
mt = ¹R
M
t¡1mt¡1 . (12)
7
We will ¯rst consider the situation in which consumers are liquidity constrained,
i.e. in which the nominal interest rate is positive and the liquidity constraint
binds. That is, we suppose mt = ¸®et¡1 and RBt > R
M
t , and we will show
that there are in general two or no steady states with this feature. Later on,
we consider the case in which the nominal interest rate is zero and in which
consumers are portfolio indi®erent, but we will show that there exists generically
no such a steady state.
Inserting (10) and (12) into the government's budget constraint (8) and using
mt = ¸®et¡1 we obtainµ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
et¡1
et¡2
¶
bt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 = bt +
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
¸®et¡1 . (13)
Similarly, (9) becomes
et + bt = (1¡ ¸)®et¡1 . (14)
Equations (13) and (14) constitute the dynamical system to be studied, provided
RMt < R
B
t : Since these equations are linearly homogenous, they can be reduced
to a one-dimensional equation. Using °t = et=et¡1 for the growth rate and xt =
bt=wt = bt= (®et¡1) for the share of bonds in income, (14) becomes
°t = ® (1¡ ¸¡ xt) , (15)
while (13) can be rewritten asµ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t¡1
¶
®xt¡1
°t¡1
+ q
f(a)
a
= ®xt +
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
¸® .
Substituting (15) into this equation, we obtain a one-dimensional dynamic equa-
tion in xt:
xt = Ã (xt¡1) (16)
=
1
®
µ
f 0(a)
xt¡1
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 ¡ ½¾
2xt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
¡
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
¸®
¶
.
The graph of the function Ã is illustrated in Figure 1.
Notice that et ¸ 0 requires that xt · 1¡ ¸. Figure 1 also shows two steady
states x1 < x2. Because of (15), the associated growth rates are °1 > °2. The
steady state with the higher growth rate (with the lower bond share) is asymp-
totically stable and the other steady state is unstable.7 Both steady states have
7Notice that in our model there in no indeterminacy since the initial bond share x0 does not
depend on expectations. This is a consequence of our assumption that neither savings nor the
coe±cient of the Clower constraint ¸ are in°uenced by in°ation expectations. Compare also
with Schreft and Smith (1997, p. 175).
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xt+1
Figure 1: Steady states in the case of constant money growth.
a positive level of government debt provided that the equation Ã(x)¡ Ã(0) = x
has a positive solution and that Ã(0) > 0. These conditions are ful¯lled if
(1¡ ¸) ¡®+ ½¾2¢ > f 0(a) and q > µ1¡ 1
¹
¶
¸
µ
1¡ f
0(a)a
f(a)
¶
:
For instance, there are two positive steady states if the uncertainty (or risk aver-
sion) and the ¯scal share are not too low. A higher level of government spending
or a lower money growth rate shift the graph of Ã upwards, increase x1 and de-
crease °1. Thus, ¯scal policy a®ects growth negatively, but money growth has
a positive impact on growth. Because of (10), the bond return increases and
the equity premium falls which shifts savings from equity to bonds and reduces
growth. A further consequence is that the equity premium and the growth rate
are positively related. Notice, however, that the comparative statics e®ects on
the other (unstable) steady state are opposite.
It remains to check whether the condition RBt > R
M
t is satis¯ed in the steady
state. Using (10) and (12), this condition is satis¯ed in a steady state if
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
° >
1
¹
° . (17)
If the government debt is positive in the stable steady state, we have °2 < °1 <
(1¡¸)®, and therefore (17) holds in both steady states whenever (17) is satis¯ed
for ° = (1 ¡ ¸)®. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, f(a) = caº, a
9
su±cient condition for (17) to hold in both steady states is that
f(a)
a
µ
º
1
1¡ ¸ + (º ¡ 1)
1
¹
¶
> ½¾2 .
Necessary for this condition to be ful¯lled is that the term in the brackets is
positive which is the case when the money growth rate is larger than (1¡ ¸)(1¡
º)=º and which is for sure satis¯ed when º ¸ 1=2.
Finally, we consider the situation of a zero nominal interest rate in which
consumers are indi®erent between holding money and bonds. Unlike the model
of Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2), our economy has generically no steady state
with that feature. To see this, notice that in this case the dynamical system is
described by (9), by
mt+1
¹mt
= RMt = R
B
t = f
0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
et
et¡1
(18)
and, using (8) and (18), by
mt
¹mt¡1
bt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 = bt +mt
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
. (19)
Again, these three equations are homogenous of degree one in (b;m; e) and they
can be reduced to two equations using the variables °t = et=et¡1, ¯t = bt=et and
ºt = mt=et. (18) yields
°t+1
ºt+1
¹ºt
= f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t , (20)
(19) becomes
°t
ºt
¹ºt¡1
¯t¡1 + q
f(a)
a
= ¯t°t + ºt°t
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
, (21)
and (9) is
ºt + ¯t + 1 =
®
°t
. (22)
(20) de¯nes a unique stationary growth rate by
° = f 0(a)
µ
1
¹
+
½¾2
®
¶¡1
.
(21) implies that a steady state has to ful¯ll
q
f(a)
a
= °
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶¡
¯ + º
¢
.
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But this latter condition is in general not compatible with (22) since this would
require that
q
f(a)
a
=
µ
1¡ 1
¹
¶
(®¡ °) ,
which can only hold true for very particular parameter constallations (for instance
if q = 0 and ¹ = 1 as in the model of Hahn and Solow (1995), but not under
more general policy speci¯cations).
The results of this section are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Under constant money growth, there are no or two steady states
in which consumers are liquidity constrained. The steady state with the higher
growth rate is asymptotically stable, and the other steady state is unstable. The
growth rate and the equity premium at the stable steady state are higher if money
growth is faster or if the ¯scal share is lower. An equilibrium with portfolio
indi®erence generally does not exist.
3.2 Fixed Money{bond Ratio
We assume here along the lines of Schreft and Smith (1998) that the monetary
authority stabilizes the money supply relative to the level of public debt in the
economy. That is, it ¯xes the ratio of bonds to money, bt=mt = · for all t: Higher
levels of · represent an increase in the bond{money ratio and correspond to a
tighter monetary regime. Starting with the case RBt > R
M
t , mt = ¸®et¡1 and (9)
yield
et = (1¡ (1 + ·)¸)®et¡1:
Therefore
°t = (1¡ (1 + ·)¸)® = ° (23)
which means that the growth rate is constant and independent of q and ½¾2:
Since the central bank ¯xes the mix of government liabilities (bonds and outside
money) over time, ¯scal policy has no e®ect on growth. Furthermore it follows
that
xt = ·¸ = x
and thus also xt is constant and independent of q and ½¾
2: By (10) the steady-
state bond return is
RB = f 0 (a)¡ ½¾
2
®
° . (24)
These results imply that a tighter monetary policy (an increase in ·) increases
bond supply and the bond return, reduces the equity premium, increases the
ration of bonds to capital, and decreases the growth rate. From (8), (10) and
mt = ¸®et¡1
RMt¡1 = (1 + ·) °t¡1 ¡
µ
f 0 (a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t¡1
¶
·¡ q
¸®
f(a)
a
°t¡1
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which in equilibrium becomes
RM =
µ
1 + ·+
½¾2
®
·¡ q
¸®
f(a)
a
¶
° ¡ f 0 (a)·: (25)
This enables us now to check the validity of the assumption that RM < RB:
Using (23), (24) and (25) we can restate this condition asµ
(1 + ·)
µ
1 +
½¾2
®
¶
¡ q
¸®
f(a)
a
¶
(1¡ (1 + ·)¸)® < (1 + ·) f 0 (a) :
For given values of the other parameters, this condition can always be ful¯lled
by assuming · and/or q big enough. Moreover, in the special case ½¾2 = q = 0
and f(a) = caº it becomes
1 + · >
1
¸
µ
1¡ º
1¡ º
¶
which is for sure satis¯ed when º ¸ 1=2:8
To complete the analysis we also consider the case of portfolio indi®erence,
i.e. RMt = R
B
t : From (9) we obtain
(1 + ·)mt + et = ®et¡1
whereas (8) and (10) yieldµ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
et¡1
et¡2
¶
(1 + ·)mt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 = (1 + ·)mt:
Setting as before °t = et=et¡1 and ºt = mt=et these equations can be written as
(1 + ·) ºt°t + °t = ®
and µ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t¡1
¶
(1 + ·) ºt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
= (1 + ·) ºt°t:
Solving for
°t =
®
1 + Ât
with Ât = (1 + ·) ºt from the ¯rst equation and inserting in the second yieldsµ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
1 + Ât¡1
¶
Ât¡1 + q
f(a)
a
=
®Ât
1 + Ât
:
8When ½¾2 = 0, the consumer is risk neutral or there is no uncertainty. This can be
considered a limiting case of our setting in which, from (7) and (10), R
E
t = R
B
t , and the
consumer's problem can then be written maxmt;bt;et R
M
t mt + R
B
t (bt + et) s.t. mt + bt + et ·
wt; mt ¸ ¸wt; et ¸ 0.
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Finally solving for Ât we obtain
Ât =
³
f 0(a)¡ ½¾2
1+Ât¡1
´
Ât¡1 + q
f(a)
a
®¡
³
f 0(a)¡ ½¾2
1+Ât¡1
´
Ât¡1 ¡ q f(a)a
= Á
¡
Ât¡1
¢
:
To explore the existence of steady states let us start with the case ½¾2 = q = 0:
Then Â = 0 is one steady state and, since Á (Â) ! 1 as Â ! ®=f 0(a), an
additional positive (unstable) steady state exists if Á0 (0) < 1. In the special case
f(a) = caº this means º < 1=2. Then, as q is slightly increased, Á (0) > 0 and
a stable positive steady state Â emerges. This remains true when ½¾2 is slightly
increased, too. However, this steady state is only an equilibrium of our model if
also the liquidity constraint mt ¸ ¸®et¡1 is satis¯ed. This constraint means that
Â ¸ ¸ (1 + ·)
1¡ ¸ (1 + ·) ,
which can be satis¯ed, if at all, only when · is small enough. That is, only a
su±ciently loose monetary policy may give rise to a steady state in which the
nominal interest rate is zero and in which consumers are portfolio indi®erent. In
any way, whenever such a steady state exists, it is clear that a variation in · does
not change Â and therefore does not change ° either. In conclusion we thus have:
Proposition 3 Under a ¯xed bond{money ratio bt=mt = ·; there is at most one
equilibrium in which consumers are liquidity constrained and which must be a
steady state. In such an equilibrium a tightening of the monetary regime (i.e. a
higher ·) decreases the growth rate, while ¯scal policy does not a®ect growth. If
the monetary regime is su±ciently loose, steady states in which consumers are
portfolio indi®erent may also exist, but in these steady states the growth rate is
independent of ·:
3.3 Interest Rate Targeting
In this case the central bank intends to ¯x the nominal interest factor It at a
value I > 1 for all t. Since I = RBt =R
M
t , consumers are liquidity constrained,
mt = ¸®et¡1. Equation (8) now becomesµ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t¡1
¶
bt¡1+q
f(a)
a
et¡1 = bt+¸®et¡1¡ 1
I
µ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾
2
®
°t¡1
¶
¸®et¡2:
Setting again xt = bt= (®et¡1), dividing by et¡1 and using (15) yields¡
f 0(a)¡ ½¾2(1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1)
¢ xt¡1
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
13
= ®xt + ¸®¡ 1
I
µ
f 0(a)¸
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 ¡ ½¾
2¸
¶
:
Solving for xt we obtain
xt =
1
®
µ
f 0(a)
xt¡1 + ¸=I
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 ¡ ½¾
2xt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
¡ ¸
µ
®+
½¾2
I
¶¶
:
The graph of this function is qualitatively the same as the one shown in Figure
1. Both steady states have a positive level of government debt if
(1¡ ¸) ¡®+ ½¾2¢ > f 0(a)µ1 + ¸
(1¡ ¸) I
¶
and q >
¸a
f(a)
µ
®+
½¾2
I
¡ f
0(a)
(1¡ ¸) I
¶
hold. This is for example true when the uncertainty/risk aversion and the ¯s-
cal share are high enough. Moreover, higher uncertainty or risk aversion and a
lower level of government spending shift the curve downwards decreasing x1 and
increasing °1. Regarding the e®ect of a change in the nominal interest rate, it
can be obtained from
@xt
@I
=
¸
®
µ
½¾2 ¡ f
0(a)
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1
¶
1
I2
:
For small uncertainty/risk aversion this derivative is negative implying that an
increase in I decreases x1 and increases °1 whereas for large ½¾
2 the e®ect is
reversed. If the uncertainty and risk aversion are low, the increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate is accompanied by a larger increase in the in°ation rate which
lowers the real interest rate and raises capital investment. On the other hand, if
uncertainty and risk aversion are large, the in°ation rate increases less than the
nominal interest rate, and so the real interest rate increases as well which a®ects
growth negatively. We have therefore obtained the following result.
Proposition 4 Under interest rate targeting there exist no or two steady states.
The steady state with the higher growth rate is asymptotically stable. A decrease
in the ¯scal share increases the growth rate and the risk premium. The e®ect of
the nominal interest target on growth is positive when uncertainty or risk aversion
is small whereas it is negative for uncertainty and risk aversion large.
3.4 In°ation Targeting
Under in°ation targeting the central bank aims to have RMt = R
M for all t and
RM > 0 predetermined. Proceeding as in the previous section, the case RBt > R
M
yields ¡
f 0 (a)¡ ½¾2(1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1)
¢ xt¡1
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
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= ®xt + ¸®
µ
1¡ R
M
®(1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1)
¶
and therefore
xt =
1
®
µ
f 0(a)xt¡1 + ¸RM
1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1 ¡ ½¾
2xt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
¡ ¸®
¶
:
The graph of this function is again as in Figure 1. Both steady states involve
positive government debt if
(1¡ ¸) ¡®+ ½¾2¢ > f 0(a) + ¸RM
1¡ ¸ and q >
¸a
f(a)
µ
®¡ R
M
1¡ ¸
¶
hold. As before, these conditions can be ful¯lled if uncertainty, risk aversion and
government consumption are large enough. Regarding the comparative statics
properties of the steady states, they are analogous to the case of interest rate
targeting. The only di®erence is that now an increase in the in°ation rate (a
lower RM) unambiguously lowers the real interest rate and increases the growth
rate.
When is it true that in a steady state RB > RM ? From (10) a necessary con-
dition is f 0 (a) > RM . This means that too low an in°ation rate is unsustainable
on a steady-state growth path with liquidity-constrained consumers. Portfolio
indi®erence, on the other hand, requires from (10) for the growth rate to be
constant with value
° =
¡
f 0(a)¡RM¢ ®
½¾2
(26)
which cannot be ful¯lled when ½¾2 = 0 (unless RM happens to be equal to f 0(a)).
However, also when ½¾2 is positive, steady states with RB = RM in general do
not exist. To see this, set as earlier ¯t = bt=et and ºt = mt=et. Then (9) yields
ºt =
®
°
¡ 1¡ ¯t , (27)
whereas (8) implies
q
f(a)
a
= (¯t + ºt) ° ¡RM(ºt¡1 + ¯t¡1):
Inserting for ºt we obtain
q
f(a)
a
= ®¡ ° ¡RM
µ
®
°
¡ 1
¶
which shows that an equilibrium can only exist if RM ful¯ls this equation. But
under in°ation targeting RM is a predetermined magnitude, and thus a steady
state with portfolio indi®erence generally does not exist.
We summarize the results on in°ation targeting as follows.
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Proposition 5 Under in°ation targeting there are no or two steady states with
liquidity-constrained consumers. The steady state with the higher growth rate is
asymptotically stable. A higher in°ation target or a lower ¯scal share increase the
growth rate and the risk premium. Equilibria with portfolio indi®erence generally
do not exist.
Notice that the results of Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are compatible with those of
3.1 and 3.2. Indeed, denoting with ¹ the steady-state increase in the nominal
money stock, it is related to inflation by ¹ = °=RM . An increase in the in°ation
rate increases ° and hence ¹. Thus ¹ and ° are correlated positively, as was
predicted in the case of constant money growth. Regarding the ratio of bonds
and and the money stock · = b=m, from (14) and mt = ¸®et¡1 it is equal to
(1¡ ¸¡ °=®) =¸: An increase in the in°ation rate increases (in the stable steady
state) ° and hence diminishes ·, meaning that · and ° are inversely correlated
as stated in section 3.2.
4 Adaptive Expectations
We have shown in the previous section that our model exhibits in most cases two
steady states in which consumers are liquidity constrained, and we argued that
the steady state which is stable in the perfect foresight dynamics is the relevant
one, whereas the unstable steady state whose policy features are opposite is of mi-
nor importance. We give now further support to this argument by showing that
a steady state which is stable under perfect foresight is also stable under adaptive
expectations, and vice versa. Thus our model predicts the same outcome in the
forward perfect foresight dynamics as under learnung with adaptive expectations.
This result contrasts to the result of Grandmont and Laroque (1986) who show
that, under their assumptions, stability in the backward perfect foresight dynam-
ics relates to stability in the actual learning dynamics.9 The following analysis
is restricted to the case of constant money growth, but we believe that similar
results can be obtained with an in°ation targeting or an interest rate targeting
policy.
Since the distribution of the capital return is the same in every period irre-
spective of the state of the economy, we assume that the consumer has learned
this distribution perfectly and forecasts correctly its mean and variance as given
by (7). However, the consumer does not perfectly foresee the in°ation rate and
we assume that he holds in period t an in°ation forecast RM;et . At the nomi-
nal interest rate It his forecast of the real interest rate is then R
B;e
t = ItR
M;e
t .
A temporary equilibrium in period t , given an in°ation expectation RM;et , is a
9In Grandmont and Laroque (1986) the law of motion of the economic system is of the type
Xt = F
¡
Xet+1
¢
whereas our system is of the form Xt = F (Xt¡1;Xet ). Expectations of the
future state Xet+1 do not enter our temporary equilibrium map, cf. footnote 7.
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real wage wt, a nominal interest rate It, and an in°ation factor R
M
t¡1 (or equiva-
lently, a price level pt) such that the labor market and all ¯nancial markets are
in equilibrium. By Walras's law, the goods market is then in equilibrium, too.
Labor market equilibrium follows again from (6), whereas the equity market is
(by construction) in equilibrium whenever consumers forecast the distribution of
the equity return correctly. Hence, there remains to consider the money and the
bond market.
When consumers are liquidity constrained (It > 1) and when investment (=
equity demand) is positive (f 0(a) ¡ ItRM;et > 0), money and bond demand are
given by
mdt = ¸wt = ¸®et¡1 and b
d
t = (1¡ ¸)®et¡1 ¡
f 0(a)¡ ItRM;et
½¾2
®et¡1 :
Since nominal money grows at constant rate ¹, money and bond supply are
mst = ¹R
M
t¡1mt¡1 and b
s
t = It¡1R
M
t¡1bt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 +RMt¡1mt¡1(1¡ ¹) .
Equilibrium in the money market implies
mt = ¸®et¡1 and RMt¡1 =
¸®et¡1
¹mt¡1
, (28)
whereas the bond market is in equilibrium if
bt = It¡1RMt¡1bt¡1 + q
f(a)
a
et¡1 +RMt¡1mt¡1(1¡ ¹) , (29)
It =
1
RM;et
µ
f 0(a)¡ ½¾2(1¡ ¸¡ bt
®et¡1
)
¶
> 1 . (30)
Again using xt for the bond share, substituting (15) for the growth rate, and
substituting It¡1 in (29) by (30), (28) and (29) yield
RMt¡1 = g(xt¡1) =
®
¹
(1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1) ,
xt = ª(xt¡1; R
M;e
t¡1 )
=
1
¹RM;et¡1
¡
f 0(a)¡ ½¾2(1¡ ¸¡ xt¡1
¢
) xt¡1 +
q
®
f(a)
a
+ ¸
µ
1
¹
¡ 1
¶
.
It is immediate from these de¯nitions that the functions ª and g satisfy10
ª1 > 0 , ª2 < 0 , g
0 < 0 . (31)
10ªi denotes the ith partial derivative of ª. The ¯rst inequality follows since f
0(a)¡½¾2(1¡
¸ ¡ xt¡1) > 0 whenever It > 0:
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Notice that the assumption of perfect foresight, RM;et¡1 = R
M
t¡1 = g(xt¡1), yields
the perfect foresight dynamics
xt = ª(xt¡1; g(xt¡1)) = Ã(xt¡1) (32)
as derived in Section 3.1. Assuming adaptive expectations, the actual dynamics
is described by
xt = ª(xt¡1; R
M;e
t¡1 ) and R
M;e
t = ´R
M;e
t¡1 + (1¡ ´)g(xt¡1) (33)
with some adjustment parameter ´ 2 [0; 1). The stability features of the forward
perfect foresight dynamics turn out to be equivalent to those under adaptive
expectations, provided that (31) holds. As a consequence of this result, the high
growth steady state x1 of Section 3.1 is also stable under adaptive expectations
and the low growth steady state x2 is unstable under adaptive expectations.
Proposition 6 Suppose that (31) holds and that x is a steady state with jÃ0(x)j 6=
1. Then x is locally stable under (32) if and only if (x; g(x)) is locally stable under
(33).
Proof: Suppose ¯rst that x is locally stable under (32). Therefore
ª1 +ª2g
0 < 1 (34)
holds at x: Let J denote the Jacobian of (33) evaluated at (x; g(x)). Then detJ =
´(ª1+ª2g
0)¡ª2g0 and TrJ = ª1+´. The steady state (x; g(x)) is locally stable
under (33) if the conditions det J < 1, detJ > TrJ ¡ 1 and detJ > ¡TrJ ¡ 1
are satis¯ed. The ¯rst of these conditions means that
´ (ª1 +ª2g
0) < 1 + ª2g0
which is clearly ful¯lled because of (34) and ª2g
0 > 0. The second condition is
equivalent to (34) and is thus satis¯ed. The third condition is ful¯lled if
(1 + ´) (1 + ª1) > (1¡ ´)ª2g0
and is satis¯ed since ª1 > 0 and ª2g
0 < ª1+ª2g0 < 1. Hence (x; g(x)) is locally
stable under (33).
Suppose conversely that (x; g(x)) is locally stable under (33) and that x is
unstable under (32). Thus, ª1 + ª2g
0 > 1; which implies that det J < TrJ ¡
1: But this implies that one eigenvalue of J has modulus greater than one, a
contradiction. 2
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5 Conclusions
We have considered an economy where consumers hold two outside assets (money
and government bonds) and capital, and where the central bank can apply di®er-
ent monetary strategies to promote growth. Multiple steady states with positive
nominal interest rates exist, whereas portfolio indi®erence steady states in which
the nominal interest rate is zero exist only in pathological situations. This result
contrasts with the analysis of Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2) who focus on
portfolio indi®erence steady states and who argue that they give rise to instability
and endogenous °uctuations.
However, even though there are multiple steady states, only one of them is
stable, not only in the dynamics with perfect foresight but also in the dynamics
with adaptive expectations. An expansive monetary policy enhances growth in
the unique stable steady state, and this result is irrespective of the monetary
strategy. Only under an interest rate targeting policy, the outcome depends
crucially on the policy's e®ect on the real interest rate. Typically, however, an
expansive monetary policy lowers the real interest rate, raises the risk premium
and promotes capital accumulation.
To keep our model analytically tractable, we have imposed some simplifying
assumptions whose relaxation would be worthful to investigate. We assumed
that consumers consume only in old age and save all their labor income. A more
general savings behaviour would allow to study the interaction between portfolio
choice and savings, and this interaction can be expected to be relevant also for
the policy conclusions. Another simpli¯cation is the assumption of an Arrow{
Romer externality leading to endogenous growth, and it would be interesting
to examine other endogenous growth models in which growth is generated from
human capital formation or from innovations.
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